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ABSTRACT
This article seeks to analyze the different ap-
proaches that Brazil and Colombia have had 
to date on the geostrategic importance of the 
South Atlantic, emphasizing the differences that 
the ocean has had for their respective concep-
tions of nation and their insertion in the South 
American region. It argues and concludes that 
while Brazil seeks leadership in South America 
by emphasizing its role as promoter of an inte-
gral autonomizing2 conception that articulates 
development, defense and regional security, 
Colombia prioritizes its role as a reference in 
the fight against transnational crime, position-
ing itself as a Middle Oceanic Power. 
 
Keywords: South Atlantic, Brazil; Colombia; 
Grand Strategy; strategic environment
RESUMEN
Este artículo busca analizar los diferentes en-
foques que Brasil y Colombia han tenido hasta 
la fecha sobre la importancia geoestratégica del 
Atlántico Sur, destacando las diferencias que ha 
tenido el océano para su respectiva concepción 
del país y su inserción en la región de América 
del Sur. Se argumenta y concluye que mientras 
Brasil busca el liderazgo en esta zona a través de 
un énfasis en su papel como promotor de una 
concepción autónoma integral para el Atlántico 
Sur que articula el desarrollo, la defensa y la se-
guridad regional, Colombia a su vez prioriza su 
papel en la región como referencia en la lucha 
contra la delincuencia transnacional, posicio-
nándose como una potencia oceánica media.
 
Palabras clave: Atlántico sur, Brasil; Colombia; 
Gran estrategia; entorno estratégico.
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Introduction
This article aims to analyze in a comparative approach the conception that Brazil and Colom-
bia have of their Atlantic maritime spaces. It studies how the two nations take into account 
their strategic environment3 to better position themselves in South America, as well as to 
contribute to the development of their nation internally. In order to investigate how Brazil 
and Colombia have strategically defined the South Atlantic, three key variables were selec-
ted: security, defense and regional development. This facilitates finding out to what extent 
these nations seek, or sought, to position themselves as bridge countries between the South 
and the North.
The author’s starting assumption is that Brazil and Colombia developed different strate-
gic conceptualizations from the 20 th century to the present on the importance of the South 
Atlantic. While Brazil’s leadership in South America was seen as significant, through its role 
as promoter of an integral autonomous conceptualization for the South Atlantic, Colombia 
in turn has seen its role in the region, mainly as a reference in the fight against transnational 
crime, positioning itself as a Middle Oceanic Power. The two nations seek to project them-
selves as guarantors of stability in South America regarding maritime issues, but Brazil has 
gone further with the aim of consolidating an autonomous regional space with respect to 
extra-regional powers. Due to recent elections for president both in Brazil and Colombia, 
which hinder a thorough analysis of the subject by 2019, our analysis will only go until the 
end of 2018. 
The main objective of this paper will be, based on the three key variables mentioned 
above, to pinpoint the main differences between these conceptualizations, in order to eval-
uate how each country is positioning itself in the region regarding maritime issues. For this 
purpose, it shall use primary and secondary sources, and semi-structured interviews. A hy-
pothetical deductive methodology will be applied to a comparative approach.
Until the end of the 17th century, Brazil, then part of the Portuguese Empire, was limited 
to a strip of colonized territories near the Atlantic. Gradually it expanded to the interior, 
greatly exceeding the line demarcated by the Treaty of Tordesillas.4 However, the sea later 
impacted its development as a nation, until now. As scholar Penna Filho stresses, the coun-
try is “much more dedicated to the sea than to the interior” (2015, p. 150). In the late 18th 
century, tropical crops such as sugar or cocoa accounted for 50% of Brazil’s exports and the 
3 Zhang et. al (2018, p. 15) state that in order to study the international strategic environment three dimensions have 
to be taken into account : peace, development and governance. They argue that “Not only the elemental characteristics 
of material, conceptual and institutional factors, but also the characteristics of the relationships related to actor´s 
strategies are all covered by these dimensions.”
4 The Treaty of Tordesillas, signed in 1494 between Portugal and Spain, established the spaces divided between the 
two kingdoms in the Atlantic and the so-called New World, in order to avoid confrontations.
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lords of the sugar mills began to assert their social status in the hierarchy of society, with 
a vast slave labor force. By 1800, Afro-descendants already accounted for two thirds of the 
population (Sellier, 2006). The culturally visible African footprint remains to this day. With 
a coastline of 7,408 km, Brazil is defined “from a geopolitical point of view” as “a mixed 
continental-maritime state, with a predominance in maritime vocations” (Meira Mattos, 
1990, p. 59).
Colombia, in turn, was a Spanish colony that favored the Andean cities of the interior. 
The coast was originally controlled by Santa Marta and Cartagena, but in the early 16th cen-
tury, the New Kingdom of Granada5 was established around Santa Fe de Bogotá, which 
became the center of its political power. Today, inland cities such as Bogotá, Medellín, Cali 
and Bucaramanga, with the exception of Barranquilla, are the most developed urban cen-
ters in the country.
According to geopolitical scientist Julio Londoño, “Colombia has a centripetal spatial 
vision,” i.e. “the strength of the country is condensed in the interior” (1949, p. 139). For 
Londoño, the Atlantic coast “is separated from the heartland and it will be many years be-
fore it can be incorporated” (1949, p. 89). Although the reality described by Londoño at the 
end of the 1940s is far from the one that characterizes Colombia today, some characteris-
tics do exist to this day, as this paper shall explain.
Brazil’s territory covers nearly half of South America and has more than 200 million in-
habitants. It’s geopolitical traits should make the country a regional power with plausible 
pretensions to be a world power. Celso Lafer also points out that due to the multiethnic com-
position and continental scale, the nation represents “another West, poorer, more enigmatic, 
more problematic, but no less the West” (2002, p. 50); determining factors that, according 
to the same author, are part of the “international identity” of the country (2002, p. 50), to 
which one could add, are its Atlantic identity.
In turn, Colombia with its Pacific and Atlantic coasts “is a maritime country because 
nearly 50% of its territory is its maritime areas” (Sánchez, 2001, p. 58). However, some 
authors emphasize that despite these characteristics, outside the use of a narrow strip of in-
ternal and maritime waters, the Andean country “has abandoned the rest of its maritime 
territory” (2001, p. 49).
The two nations have concentrated their efforts on ensuring maritime security with dif-
ferent approaches, as will be discussed below. It is worth noting that, as Germond (2015) 
states, in academic debates, maritime security has not been given great importance and 
only in the early 21st century did it become relevant in these discussions. The author de-
fines it as “a set of policies, regulations, measures and operations to secure the maritime 
domain” (2015, p. 137). Germond suggests that when we seek to study maritime security in 
5 Originally placed under the Viceroyalty of Peru. 
296 ⎥  Gisela da silva Guevara
Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales⎥ Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Nueva Época, Año lxiv, núm. 237⎥ septiembre-diciembre de 2019 ⎥ pp. 293-314⎥ ISSN-2448-492X
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2019.237.67719
a geo-strategic dimension we should articulate it with naval geo-strategy and transatlantic 
security. The present article will focus mainly on analyzing the meaning of maritime secu-
rity both for Brazil and Colombia’s visions of the Atlantic, for their role in South America 
and for their strategic identities.
The present article will analyze the geopolitical visions that were developed on the part 
of Brazil and Colombia regarding the South Atlantic in the 20th and early 21st centuries, in 
order to evaluate how relevant the ocean is in terms of development, defense and regional 
security for each of the countries. The comparative approach will be applied to the case study 
in order to analyze the fundamental differences that exist between the two countries in or-
der to understand the relevance of the South Atlantic for the two nations.
Thereafter, the strategies used by Brazil and Colombia related to their respective South Atlan-
tic geo-strategic visions will be studied in order to assess how important (or unimportant) the 
South Atlantic is for their development and defense objectives, in national and regional terms.
Theoretical approaches to the topic
In order to analyze the strategy of nations, it is important to bear in mind that there are 
several approaches to it. The one that usually predominates in academic studies is that of 
the realists or neo-realists. According to Mearsheimer (2001), the strategy of great world 
powers is a combination of power and fear, which determines the degree of competition in 
the world to ensure their security, as well as the likelihood of involvement in war.
Mearsheimer (2001) argues that fear leads the powers to focus, mainly, on assuring their 
military offensive capabilities. Thus, for the offensive neo-realists, the States are mainly focused 
on defining which countries are threats to their survival, based essentially on the offensive ca-
pabilities of their rivals and not on their intentions. War is the natural and obvious outcome 
of this competition. According to van Hooft (2017) Great Strategy does not need to be grandi-
ose or ambitious, but rather due to the fact that it is originated in the military field, its purpose 
is to lead to the successful use of military force in times of war, and of peace. In peace, it is 
related to the use of coercion and deterrence. In the case of Brazil this is especially relevant.
For Legro (2005), power is a tool. However, this does not always explain the strategy of 
nations to achieve their goals, because the case studies analyzed by this scholar are not con-
clusive in terms of the loss of power of a nation, internationally. He gives as an example the 
case of the United Kingdom at the beginning of the 20th century, when they were losing 
power to the United States, without entering into war with this country. The explanation 
for Legro is that it is related to the existence of lasting ideas that united the two nations.
Legro (2005) emphasizes how ideas interact on a regular basis with “strategic circum-
stances” and internal political pressures in his study. Based on the grand strategy defined 
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by Barry Posen,6 he focuses on beliefs related to “effective means for achieving interests and 
how States think about achieving their ends” (2005, p. 7). Legro observes that there are sev-
eral types of ideas, such as identity, preferences and causal beliefs, which must be studied in 
interaction with the international scenario, in order to understand the Grand Strategy. The 
author emphasizes that, in the case study of the United States, there has been an interaction 
between ideas and events that led the country to leave its traditional position of isolating 
itself as a result of the end of the First World War, moving to a stance of intervention and 
of internationalism after World War II. This regards a shift in the ideology of foreign pol-
icy that made popular considerations in geopolitics.
Grand Strategy is conceptualized by Brands (2010) as “the relationship of means to ends, 
the process by which nations harness and allocate resources in the service of their inter-
national objectives” (2010, p. 60). The same author argues that Grand Strategy “represents 
an integrated conception of interests, threats, resources, and policies” (Brands, 2012, p. 
4). Russell and Tokatlian (2013), in turn, argue that the “small strategies of Latin Amer-
ica,” although designed in the first place for local challenges and threats, opened a window 
of opportunity to apply autonomy and/or acquiescence to the strategies of Latin Ameri-
ca’s relations with the world, emphasizing relations with the United States. In other words, 
the strategy of Latin American countries aims mainly to apply autonomous strategies and/
or acquiescence in their extra-regional relations.7 Moreover, Milani and Nery (2019, p. 74) 
argue that “a grand strategy supposes a self-conscious identification and priority-setting in 
terms of foreign policy, defense goals, international cooperation, and partnerships with na-
tional businesses.” 
The present article shall examine the meaning of the South Atlantic in the way Brazil and 
Colombia visualize their strategic identity as nations that aspire to position themselves as se-
curity referents in South America. Articulated with these aspects are the issues of how naval 
strategies have a linkage to Grand strategy. Moreover, maritime power, according to Ribeiro 
Luís, “regards all the resources used and activities carried out by the navy, including land ad-
ministration” (Ribeiro Luís, 2015, p. 124). This paper will analyze how concepts of strategic 
identity explain the Grand strategy of South American countries such as Brazil and Colombia.
We shall start from the premise that the Grand strategy of nations is closely articulated 
with the study of strategic identity (SI); the latter, as defined by Tibiletti (2014). For him, 
SI includes the national strategic identity, which covers political geography, as well as so-
6 Posen (2014, p. 1) defines grand strategy as “a nation-state´s theory about how to produce security for itself ”.
In an interview with Scott Beauchamp, Barry Posen defined Great strategy as “basically a set of concepts that outlines 
threats, discusses political and military remedies, talks a little bit about why those remedies might work, assigns some 
priorities to threats and to remedies, and it has to be conscious of scarcity. There’s usually some limited amount of 
resources that state has to spend on its purpose” (Beauchamp, 2014).
7 As for a comparative case study between Mexico and Brazil see Da Silva Guevara and Ardila (2018).
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cial, ideological and cultural aspects, among others, which, in turn, is articulated with the 
dialogue that feeds with its sub-regional, regional and global environment. It also consists 
of vital and strategic national interests, being a social construction. For Tibiletti (2014) the 
visions within a nation in terms of the construction or deconstruction of its strategic iden-
tity are always made in consensus with the other States.
In this comparative case, this paper will also take into account critical geopolitics, since this 
theoretical approach is based on the assumption that it is necessary to study the discourses 
of geopolitics and international relations from the elites, which start from the perception of 
the world. The latter includes assumptions, norms and conventions (Dodds, 2005). More-
over, O’Tuathail and Dalby (2002, pp. 307-308), key figures related to the research on critical 
geopolitics, argue that “The popular representations of Others are part of the larger process 
whereby geopolitical imagi-nations are used in the process of foreign policy formulations.” 
The truth is that, despite not representing any monolithic theory, critical geopolitics draws 
attention to the fact that the world view is not objective, but that geopolitics must be “con-
ceptualized as much as discourse, as political practice” (Dodds, 2005, p. 31).
This article examines in a comparative manner the practice of “spatialization” of re-
gional and world politics, not so much from the perspective of the process that led to having 
strategic options, but from the implicit practice that led to the choices of strategic options 
regarding the insertion of Brazil and Colombia into their South American environment. 
O Toal (ÓTuathail) (2005, p. 46) states that the “study of geopolitics is the study of the spa-
tialization of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states.” Nonetheless, 
geopolitical and geostrategic analyzes should also take into account the strategic visions of 
the Global South, and among others, of Latin American countries.
In line with what was stated by Kuus (2017), it is necessary to dismantle binary ap-
proaches, such as East/West or development/underdevelopment, which still remain in the 
geopolitical assumptions of international studies. This implies that we have to study more 
closely, among other things, the geopolitical visions embodied in South American strate-
gies to spatialize their environment; in the present case study the one in regard to the South 
Atlantic. It is mainly about analyzing how different visions of the interaction between the 
borders of South American countries and their maritime environment mean (or not) a po-
tentialization of their significance as guarantors of regional development, as well as their 
roles in the stability of regional security.
The above mentioned means that when this paper refers to strategic visions of the South 
Atlantic from Brazil and Colombia, it takes into account that the positioning sought by the 
two nations in South America in their Grand strategy, with the contribution of its academic 
elites and military circles, among others, does not derive from an objective geopolitical re-
ality, but rather from an ideational tradition, as well as material factors, based on different 
visions in terms of development, defense and regional security. It is noteworthy that in South 
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America there are significant divergences of conceptual approaches in terms of what devel-
opment means; for example, Brazil supports development proposals for the region that do 
not coincide with those of other countries.8
Brazil and Colombia: Strategic Concepts on the South Atlantic
At the beginning of the 21st century, the Brazilian Navy coined the concept of “Blue Amazon”, 
which “designates the Brazilian maritime spaces, in an area about 4.5 million km, corres-
ponding in size, to the terrestrial Amazon” (Ministry of Defense, Brazil, n. d.). Attached to 
the Blue Amazon is the Articulation and Defense Equipment Plan (paed in Portuguese), 
which seeks to strengthen the country’s capacity to act autonomously on the international 
scene, reducing its weaknesses in the face of external pressures (Ministério da Defesa, Bra-
sil, n.d.). The emergence of the concept of the Blue Amazon shows, according to Mattos, et 
al. (2017, p. 268), the sense of “greatness” and “projects [Brazil] as a motor of development 
and contributes to the country’s desire to be seen as ‘the nation of the future’”. 
In 2012 when the National Defense Plan (ndp) was published, it was highlighted that 
Brazil visualized its “strategic environment,” by embracing the African countries near the 
Atlantic and the Antarctica. According to Fiori (2013) the African countries on the Atlantic 
coast would become an important region of influence of Brazil. The same author empha-
sizes that since the 70s the Brazilian Navy had begun to develop its own autonomous plan 
in the Atlantic with the Strategic Plan of the Navy. In reality, the country sought to obtain 
greater autonomy in the international system.
In the early 21st century, under Lula da Silva (2003-2010), Brazil was seeking “autonomy 
through diversification,” which according to Vigevani and Cepaluni (2009, p.6) was to give 
special importance to South-South relations. The goal was to obtain a better “capacity to 
negotiate with more powerful countries,” promoting multipolarity. Moreover, Brazil was 
positioning itself in the South Atlantic9 with cooperation initiatives that aimed at a novel 
approach in which regional security and development were closely connected. This geopo-
8 See for example Stuhldreher (2017).
9 Freres (2013) draws attention to the fact that there is no consensus among the authors on the delimitation of the 
South Atlantic. While in some studies they define it as “all the countries of the Atlantic basin below the Tropic of 
Cancer” (2013, p. 127), others place it south of the dividing line south of the 15th parallel, between Trinidad and Tobago 
and Dakar. As for Freres himself, he prefers a broader conception of the South Atlantic that “covers from Mexico 
to Argentina, on the one hand, and all of Africa on the other” (2013:127). In turn, Ribeiro Luís (2016) prefers the 
delimitation of the South Atlantic according to what was adopted by the International Hydrographic Organization in 
1953, but ends up considering that “more than a geographical definition, the South Atlantic is a political designation, 
as in a group of countries that share similar political concerns related to the sea, covering the signatory countries of 
Zopacas.” (2016: 84).
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litical vision incorporated a multidimensional paradigm in which military security became 
tied to food or environmental security, among other issues within the framework of non-tra-
ditional security aspects (Da Silva Guevara, 2018).
According to the above mentioned Brazil’s South-South relations, in the line of its strate-
gic environment’s conceptualization, especially with African countries of the Atlantic coast, 
it could be seen in the light of a “soft revisionism,” stressed by Milani and Nery (2019) as 
related to the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff. Thus, the concept of Blue 
Amazon can be considered beyond a simple protection of natural resources or commercial 
routes, being also studied in the line of a linkage to geopolitical visions related to a South 
Atlantic as a more autonomous zone in favor of the Global South under Brazilian leadership.
Brands points out that during the eight years of the presidency of Lula da Silva, the 
Grand strategy followed by the country was based on three priority axes, namely 1) balanc-
ing against the United States; 2) the construction of coalitions to strengthen the bargaining 
power of Brazil and 3) the strengthening of the country’s leadership in South America. De-
spite the shift on this policy since 2015 and, above all, after the impeachment process of Dilma 
Rousseff, these three axes are still useful to analyze. This article is focused, above all, on the 
South Atlantic, viewing it as relevant axis of Brazil´s Grand strategy, compared to Colombia.
The relevance of a South Atlantic’s axis has historical precedents in Brazilian geopolitical 
schools. For example, Therezinha de Castro (1986) emphasizes that “we continue, in spite 
of our continentality, much more connected to the sea; near the Atlantic lies our geo-his-
toric nucleus and our state ecunem” (Castro, 1986, p. 17). As for Golbery do Couto e Silva 
(1967), he foresaw for Brazil the need for the country to take the leadership of the develop-
ing world, in order to consolidate an area in the South Atlantic that articulated the security 
to development, for the sake of promoting an area of  peaceful stability.
It should be noted that when do Couto e Silva vindicated Brazil’s role in defense of regional 
and even hemispheric defense and security, it did not consider development issues to such a 
long extent, as today, or at least not according to the approaches that Brazil supports in the 
21st century. However, he argued that security and development were closely linked (1967). 
Today, Brazil strengthens the United Nations approach to a “green economy in the context of 
sustainable development and the eradication of poverty” (cited in Stuhldreher, 2017, p. 81). 
Additionally, it should be noted that, unlike countries like Colombia, Brazil has emphasized, 
in terms of cooperation initiatives, especially during the governments that it has had in the 
21st century, an integral conceptualization of development and regional security and defense.
As for Colombia, Julio Londoño (1949, p.37), although acknowledging that the Atlantic 
is “the sea of  the great navigation axes of the continental masses,” he emphasizes that “the 
Pacific coast is more straight and open than the Atlantic,” seeing in these aspects an obsta-
cle for the Atlantic side of the country to show promise. On the other hand, he observed 
that Colombia’s relations with Panama took on the character of a strategic concept and that 
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“in the way we understand these relationships and the capacity we have to handle them, a 
large part of our future is locked in.” (Londoño, 1949, p. 136).
Similarly, one could conclude from the comments of the Colombian military regarding 
the historical past of the dissolution of the Great Colombia, that the country created a new 
space on which it had to rethink its reconstruction as a nation. Despite writing the book in 
the forties of the twentieth century, Londoño stressed that Colombia had not yet overcome 
the “trauma” of the loss of territory and sought through a “symbiosis” of “geography and 
politics” to try “an intelligent and profound reconciliation” (1949, pp. 152-153). The loss of 
a strategic position in the Panamanian isthmus would undoubtedly affect the way Colom-
bia would relate to its maritime surfaces. As Drekonja points out in this regard, the loss of 
Panama implied a “geopolitical devaluation” for Colombia (2011, p. 53).
Colombia, according to Sánchez (2001, p. 213), “lives with its back to the sea.” This despite 
the fact that its maritime surface is 928,660 km2 (Instituto Codazzi, n.d.), encompassing a 
maritime jurisdictional area similar to that of its continental and insular territories, that is, 
Colombia is half sea (Invemar, n.d.). The major criticism that Sánchez (2001) makes to the 
maritime policy guidelines of Colombia is that the general interest was not taken into account 
due to individual economic interests. Likewise, foreign advisers had warned that Colom-
bian shipping companies did not have the conditions to compete in the globalized market.
Sánchez (2001) concludes that although it is true that the Colombian marine merchants 
had created a “strategic vision,” it ended up capsizing in the face of the lack of a long-term 
perspective. Finally, “fifty years after its creation,” the country witnessed “its death and 
third burial” (Sánchez, 2001, p. 245). On the other hand, according to the same author, the 
Maritime Policy of Colombia neglected the ports, which led to the failure of the country’s 
maritime policy.
Colombia was one of the first countries to raise the subject of the heritage sea, whereby 
it was justified that countries could claim an area of  200 miles to “ensure that their resources 
contribute to national development and the subsistence of their peoples” (Sánchez, 2001, 
p. 328), which would lead to the recognition of the exclusive economic zone for countries 
with a coastline. However, criticism was made regarding the failure of Colombia to take 
measures to implement those rights. 
In the 70s Brazil adhered to the Treaty of Antarctica. On this topic, the geopolitical scien-
tist Terezinha de Castro (1986: 21) emphasized that “Antarctica, together with the Brazilian 
islands and sub-Antarctic archipelagos, constitute important fronts of our defense in the 
South Atlantic.” Therefore, in the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, a geopolitical and geo-
strategic conceptualization that encompassed Brazilian regional and national security was 
implied. With this treaty, the new concept of a neighborhood on the “Eastern border,” fa-
vored by the Atlantic, emerged (Barbosa cited in Penha, 2011, p. 218). As for Colombia, the 
country would only accept the Antarctic Treaty in 1989.
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At the end of the 80s, Brazil launched the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South 
Atlantic (Zopacas) initiative. This initiative had been presented in 1986 within the frame-
work of the United Nations and although approved, Washington had voted against that 
resolution. Brazil sought, objectively, to promote a zone of denuclearized peace in the 
South Atlantic, although it also aimed to “avoid the implementation of foreign bases and 
the elimination of foci of conflict and intrazonal tension” (Yapur cited in Aranda e Silva, 
2010, p. 26). The initiative was framed in the context of the end of the Cold War, by which 
the South American country sought to consolidate its defensive and economic interests 
in the South Atlantic, even against the pretensions of the United States or its allies, espe-
cially the United Kingdom, at the same time that it tried to strengthen ties with the African 
countries of the Atlantic.
At the same time Bogotá in the eighties strengthened ties with Washington in order to 
contain the Nicaraguan claims regarding the archipelago of San Andrés and Providencia. 
However, the interaction should not be taken as subordination, because President Turbay 
(1978-1982) encouraged the inclusion of Colombia in the Non-Aligned Movement and 
produced a shift on the anti-Argentina position of his predecessor. Turbay also spoke in fa-
vor of greater solidarity with the so-called Third World (Bagley and Tokatlián, 2011). On 
the other hand, “Bogotá’s desire to be recognized as a “regional power” in the Caribbean, 
precisely because it was not taken into account by Washington, aroused an interest in the 
Caribbean and additionally “in concentric circles” (Drekonja, 2011, p. 69).
Brazil, on the other hand, sought to solidify its ties with Africa, based on geographic 
proximity and cultural ties, which “would facilitate the promotion of independent regional 
interactions of the great powers” (Penha, 2011, p. 218). The country’s efforts to promote 
Zopacas in the 1980s were similarly articulated with Brazil’s efforts in the UN to consoli-
date itself as “the voice of the voiceless.” Foreign Minister Araújo Castro’s three-D speech 
became famous, for which Brazil promoted Decolonization, Development and Disarma-
ment (Lafer, 2002). In turn, historian Amado Cervo emphasizes that the country followed 
a line of “diplomacy for development” until the 1990s (2001, p. 56). Brazil, according to this 
approach, would lead the South to development, being that issues of regional security and 
defense would be closely tied to the development of South American and African coun-
tries, through which the Atlantic would be a bridge between peoples.
The Colombian leadership was more recently expressed on issues of transnational security 
in the Atlantic, by virtue of a meeting in Ghana between Colombia and African countries, in 
June 2017, whereby working mechanisms were agreed between the Andean country and the 
police of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, among others, regarding intelligence, 
training in identification procedures, destruction of narcotics and transnational crime (Co-
lombian Foreign Affairs, 2017). This is one of many examples of Colombian leadership in 
dealing with security issues in the South Atlantic.
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In turn, for the United States, Colombia could serve as a strategic area of containment 
of Brazil, meaning the Andean country could be included in a strategic fence, which would 
allow the United States to eventually contain and monitor the actions of Brazil. This logic 
is followed by Ostos Cetina (2011), who states that Washington turns Bogotá into its rim-
land. On the other hand, considering some of the premises of critical geopolitics, Colombia 
consciously assumes the role of a country that exercises restraint on Brazil, based on the 
self-perception of an alternative reference to Brasilia for the stability of regional security. In 
other words, the Andean country is no longer a passive object of the North American strat-
egy, but rather an active subject of a triangular strategy that allows it to gain prominence in 
the South American region. In the Bogotá-Washington-African countries interaction, the 
role of each of the two poles is no longer static, but reshape a relationship that is no longer 
South-North, or traditional dependency, but allows us to reconstruct a regional security au-
tonomizing space in which the boundaries between North and South vanish.
The 2015-2018 Colombian Strategic Naval Plan (pen in Spanish) mentions the strate-
gic environment of the country in regard to Latin America and the Caribbean, including 
factors that endanger national security, such as the illegal exploitation of natural resources 
and border disputes (National Navy of Colombia, n.d.). Moreover, the pen mentions the 
“adverse ruling” made by The Hague at the end of 2012 regarding the maritime boundar-
ies between Colombia and Nicaragua, which “has posed important national challenges for 
the future” (National Navy of Colombia, n.d., p. 21). It also emphasizes the importance of 
consolidating the national Navy as “a Navy with dissuasive capacity” (11). 
In Colombia, although the official speeches are not so blunt in this regard, the country 
cultivates its stabilizing role in maritime security, especially as a bridge between Washington 
and West Africa, emphasizing its role as a reference in the fight against transnational crime.
It was possible to verify in this section that, while the Brazilian conception of a strategic 
environment in the South Atlantic aims at positioning the country as promoter of an auto-
nomous area, enhancing an integral, multidimensional security for the South American and 
African peoples, for Colombia it rather aimed to give the image of a guardian, enhancing 
the fight against transnational crime, making the bridge between North and South. In the 
next section it will be seen how the two nations pursue their respective strategies in order 
to advance their different geopolitical approaches and goals related to the South Atlantic.
Security Strategies in the South Atlantic: Brazil vis-à-vis Colombia
According to Pereyra (2013: 12) “Brazil’s position in the international system is ambi-
guous,” acting in “a hybrid position between the North and South,” which explains some 
of the country’s strategic options regarding the South Atlantic. In the draft regarding the 
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White Book of National Defense, approved by former President Temer10 and placed under 
discussion in the Brazilian Congress, it is emphasized that “in geopolitical terms, Brazil gi-
ves priority to its immediate environment, defined as a strategic environment, constituted 
by South America, the South Atlantic, the west coast of Africa and the Antarctic.” It is also 
emphasized that the country promotes a “cooperative multipolarity,” by which “governance 
mechanisms more representative of the new international reality are being fostered” (Mi-
nistry of Defense, Brazil, 2017).
Therefore, it is possible to verify in the official objectives of Brazil regarding the South 
Atlantic, the ambition to consolidate a geostrategic area of  security and development for 
the Global South, by which the nation seeks the leadership of the ambitions of the South, 
even if it goes against the interests of extra-regional powers. This concerns emancipatory 
and autonomizing contours, and maybe revisionists.11
According to former Brazilian Minister for Defense, Raul Jungman, “part of our im-
mediate strategic environment, the South Atlantic is the living space for Brazil” (2017). 
Among the arguments advanced by the minister was that this ocean contains mineral re-
serves and 95% of Brazil’s international trade routes. In this regard, to what extent does 
Brazil transform and shape a new strategic identity with African countries, moving away 
from a traditional Ratzelian vision of “living space?” Kuus (2017) emphasizes that critical 
geopolitics is not so much about investigating the limits of sovereignty, but “how the power 
of the State is produced discursively and in practice in territorial and non-territorial forms.” 
The identity strategic of states is built and (re)built based on self-perceptions and the per-
ceptions of other states.
In the 21st century, Colombia and its strategists are focused on building and consolidat-
ing the sovereignty of the country in the oceans. If necessary, in spite of the interference of 
third parties. Sánchez stresses that “interference of third parties to prevent Colombia and 
its nationals from using and exploiting the resources of the ocean and coastal spaces must 
be counteracted by its military power” (2001, p. 370). Regarding the court decision of The 
Hague in the Nicaragua-Colombia dispute, a document from the Colombian Foreign Min-
istry mentions that the “expansionist desires of Nicaragua” will be obstructed (Colombian 
Foreign Ministry, n. d.).
Colombia also claims regional leadership in the seas, as observed in the statement of 
Admiral Soltau (Colombian Ocean Commission, n. d., p. 26) according to which “the in-
10 Temer became President of Brazil in august 2016 after an impeachment process that removed Dilma Rousseff from 
office.
11 It is not the object of the present article to deepen revisionism on the part of Brazil. According to Morse and Keo-
hane (2014), contested multilateralism is defined as “the situation that results from the pursuit of strategies by states, 
multilateral organizations and non-state actors to use multilateral institutions, existing or newly created, to challenge 
the rules, practices or missions of existing multilateral institutions” (p. 387).
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tegral management of its maritime territory is a fundamental bastion in the generation of 
regional leadership, whose benefits for Colombians and for all America are obvious.” It re-
mains to be seen whether the shortcomings of the capabilities of the navy will allow this 
role to be specified.
As for Brazil, Mattos et al. (2017, p. 267) observe that the South Atlantic region “has a 
profound strategic importance” for the country. Issues of development in alliance with a 
Global South, emancipated through their transatlantic ties, are again and again emphasized 
in the official speeches of the Brazilian leaders. However, Aranda e Silva (2010) emphasizes 
that the strengthening of Brazil’s role in the South Atlantic may lead to confrontations with 
the United States. As for China and Russia, these relations with Brazil are still unclear.
Milani and Nery (2019, p. 80) rightly stress that “Brazilian foreign policy has often had 
a strong developmentist component.” In order to understand the link between this com-
ponent and the strategies pursued by Brazil related to the South Atlantic, mainly regarding 
African nations, it is important to take into account that the country has strongly invested 
in international cooperation. Abdenur and Marcondes (2013) argue that this aspect aims 
at consolidating a “South Atlantic identity,” pursuing its own regional goals and interests. 
Brazil’s South-South development cooperation has embraced military issues, along with 
agro-technological and health programmes. Agriculture has been one of the main coopera-
tion areas between Brazil and the African countries, embracing the participation of various 
ministries, such as the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of Social development (Mi-
lani et al., 2016).
Emerging countries use development assistance to promote their economic interna-
tional insertion (Burges, 2012). Nonetheless, it is important to take into account not only 
economic goals regarding South-South solidarity, but also a Grand strategy that includes 
a South Atlantic axis, in order to improve an autonomous area under Brazilian leadership. 
As for Colombia, its Grand strategy can be verified by the actions of the country by esta-
blishing itself as a Middle Oceanic Power. Vera (2017, p. 41) emphasizes that “Colombia has 
being projected itself as an intermediate power that aims to influence and even guide some 
speeches and practices of international security and on specific issues […] of the internatio-
nal agenda.” In turn, Ardila (2012) defines Colombia as “a secondary power in the process 
of definition” between Central America and South America. In fact, Colombia has actively 
participated in regional security cooperation networks, especially with Central America. 
This cooperation has covered not only the fight against illegal drug trafficking and trans-
national crime, but also the preventive and social policy of citizen security, by building a 
sub-regional security order with multilevel coordination (Vera, 2017). 
Tickner and Morales (2015) state that the opening of the Colombian embassy in Ghana 
in 2014 is related to the objective of expanding its cooperation with Africa within the frame-
work of regional security. This objective is in line with a triangulated cooperation strategy 
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between African countries, Colombia and the United States, which seeks above all to deal 
with transnational crime. Tickner (personal communication, March 2018) emphasizes that 
such cooperation can be understood in two ways, namely 1) The United States prefers to 
work with Colombia, instead of intervening directly in third world countries and 2) From 
the Colombian perspective, there is a regional and international strategy, positioning itself 
as an expert country in security issues, especially in issues related to drug trafficking and 
organized crime. 
Colombia has built up the Security Strategy towards Africa, launched in 2011. It aimed 
to coordinate activities regarding international crime, violence and human rights, among 
others (Borda and Morales, 2017). It is important to take into account that the country has, 
since 2015, redefined its policy against illegal drugs, but as Borda and Morales stress, there 
is a contradiction between its foreign policy against drugs and its domestic policy, along 
with the problem of the 2016 peace agreement between the farc (Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia) and the Colombian government.
Flemes (2010) argues that regional powers are part of a region with geographic, eco-
nomic and political-ideational characteristics. In the same way they articulate ambitions to 
lead a region, the effectively influence international affairs and define substantially the re-
gional security agenda. Regarding these characteristics, Brasilia undoubtedly uses the 
South Atlantic to consolidate its leadership as a regional power. In turn, Bogotá does it 
on some occasions and on sectorial issues, but to a lesser degree than Brazil and with a less 
clear conceptualization.
Finally, this article tries to understand how various conceptualizations on the South 
Atlantic are related to strategies this regarding developed by Brazil and Colombia. It is per-
tinent to mention that as for Brazil, the South Atlantic represents an area of  consolidation 
of its national power, but at the same time it serves as a bridge-country, for example when 
its ties with Africa allow it to enhance its discourse of the “voice of the voiceless.” This gives 
it legitimacy when it promotes cooperation in defense with countries such as Angola or Na-
mibia. In turn, Colombia, as Chile and Argentina, “use soft power12 and public diplomacy to 
improve their image, exercise leadership, build new alliances and seek a new regional bal-
ance” (Ardila, 2014, p. 90). In this regional balance, the Pacific and the Atlantic are vital for 
Bogotá. With respect to the Pacific Alliance, Pastrana Buelvas, Betancourt y Castro (2014, 
p. 181) state that “it does not intend to exclude the United States but, on the contrary, priv-
ileges their relationship with the superpower”. 
The above allows for a differentiation Brazil from the Colombian case: Brasilia has tried 
to move the United States and the United Kingdom away from the maritime zone, which 
would eventually enable the formation of a Pax Brasiliana as defined by Mattos et al. Ar-
12 Vera (2017) prefers to mention a combined use of soft and hard strategies on the part of Colombia.
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royave (2012, p. 251), in turn, emphasizes that “through South Americanism, Brazil intends 
to configure a regional-South America-free zone from the influence of other regional pow-
ers, especially the United States”. However, since 2016 the new government of Temer has 
shown a propensity to collaborate with the United Kingdom on the issue of the Falklands/
Malvinas, breaking the solidarity with Argentina regarding the claims of Buenos Aires in 
the archipelago. 
It is possible to state that organizations such as Zopacas, despite having a lax structure, 
could advance, from the viewpoint of Brasilia, an autonomizing area, protecting South 
America and Africa from extra-regional powers’ ambitions. Nonetheless, while Brazil aims 
to shape an institutional autonomizing multilateral structure in the South Atlantic, Co-
lombia does not seek to do so, due to fears that this organizations could limit its margin of 
action, externally and internally.
Conclusion
Brazil and Colombia have different geopolitical visions of their Atlantic maritime spaces. 
The evidence is overwhelming that the two nations make efforts to think about their stra-
tegic environment in order to better insert themselves in the South American space, as well 
as to contribute to the development of their national spaces. However, it was Brazil that 
went the furthest in conceptualizing a South Atlantic that, in consolidating a regional go-
vernance, may, in the future, form a more autonomous area in terms of security, defense 
and sustainable development. In the case of Colombia, the efforts to expand its area of  in-
fluence to the Antarctic shows that in the 21st century the nation stopped being so focused 
on its continental spaces and is looking for new strategic horizons.
In the 60s and especially in the 70s, Brazil sought not only to create an autonomizing 
space guided by the diversification of its relations, such as those established with Germany 
for a nuclear agreement in 1975, but also by the consolidation of a more autonomous mar-
itime space of the great powers, especially, at that time, of the United States. In the 21st 
century, Brazil’s official objectives with respect to the South Atlantic demonstrate the am-
bition to consolidate a geostrategic area of  security and development for the global South, 
through which the nation seeks leadership in the South’s ambitions, even if these go against 
the interests of extra-regional powers… all this within an emancipatory and autonomiz-
ing framework.
Colombia, with the loss of Panama in the early 20th century, had suffered, according to 
Drekonja’s definition, a “geopolitical devaluation.” It seeks, in the 21st century, to reposition 
itself in the South Atlantic as a referent for security, but in proportions more modest than 
Brazil. However, the triangular cooperation between Colombia, the United States and some 
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African countries leads us to conclude that their initiatives to position their geostrategic in-
terests are in favor of being a Middle Oceanic power.
Both countries seek to be a bridge between the South and the North. Brazil has positioned 
itself as the voice of the underprivileged against an apathetic North towards the develop-
ment problems of the global South, in a more autonomous position which is committed 
to making the South Atlantic an area that emancipates itself from extra-regional models, 
while Colombia is seeking cooperation with the North to enhance its role as a reference for 
security, especially in terms of transnational crime.
Based on the definition of Tibiletti (2014) of strategic identity, it is possible to conclude 
that the visions within a nation regarding the construction or deconstruction of its identity 
are always made in dialogue with the other States. Similarly, following some of the prem-
ises of critical geopolitics, it was possible to observe that the construction and reconstruction 
of the strategic identities of Brazil and Colombia are articulated in dynamics for which the 
American environment and the South Atlantic are reshaped in an interaction of maritime 
neighbors and powers of the South and the North.
While in classical geopolitics notions such as living space or zones of influence are rigid, 
and correspond rather to more static strategic identities, the focus of this article makes it 
possible to demonstrate that the way countries such as Brazil and Colombia reimagine South 
American and South Atlantic environments is less static.
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